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State, Bd. of Architecture v. Dist. Ct., 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 49 (October 3, 2019)1
JUDICIAL REVIEW: FINAL DECISIONS AND PREMATURELY FILED PETITIONS
Summary
The Court had two holdings in this case. First, a final decision for purposes of judicial review must
contain a detailed finding of facts and conclusions of law by an administrative agency. Second,
when a petition for judicial review is filed prematurely, it does not vest jurisdiction in the district
court.
Background
Dennis Rusk, the real party in interest, was licensed as an architect in Nevada. In 2011,
The Nevada State Board of Architecture, Interior Design and Residential Design (“Board”) held a
hearing regarding Rusk’s designs. Rusk had two complaints alleging that his designs did not
include the necessary fire/life safety elements. The Board found Rusk to be in violation of Nevada
law and Rusk was ordered to pay a fine as well as the Board’s fees and costs. In addition, Rusk’s
registration as an architect was placed on probation until he completed certain courses. Rusk
petitioned The District Court of Nevada for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The court
affirmed the decision. Rusk then appealed to The Supreme Court of Nevada, but the Court
dismissed the appeal for failure of timely filing.2
In light of new evidence, Rusk moved to vacate the Board’s decision in 2016. The district
court granted Rusk’s petition for judicial review and remanded that the Board reconsider its
previous decision in light of the new-found evidence. Per the court’s instructions, the Board held
a hearing regarding Rusk on October 25, 2017. The Board unanimously voted to uphold Rusk’s
original discipline and deny him relief. The Board did not discuss specific facts or laws to support
their decision but stated a written order would be drafted. On November 9, 2017, Rusk petitioned
for judicial review on the Board’s decision before a written order was filed. Shortly after, on
December 1, 2017, the Board issued its written order. On January 9, 2018, the Board moved to
dismiss Rusk’s petition because Rusk did not supplement his petition after the Board filed their
order. The district court denied the Board’s motion to dismiss stating that the Board’s decision
during the October 25 hearing was sufficient enough for Rusk to petition for judicial review. The
Board then petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition challenging the district
court’s order that denied their motion to dismiss.
Discussion
The Board argued that NRS 233B.130(2)(d) stated a mandatory jurisdictional requirement
and that the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider Rusk’s petition because it was not
filed in 30-days.3 A writ of prohibition may be issued when a district court acts without/in excess
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of its jurisdiction and the petitioner lacks a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.4 A district
court may consider a petition for judicial review if it is a matter of first impression; this case
presents an issue of first impression.
An administrative agency’s order must contain detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law to
constitute a final decision for purposes of judicial review.
The court needs to determine if the Board’s October 25 hearing constituted as a final
decision under NRS Chapter 233B.5 NRS 233B.125 provides that a final decision: (1) must be in writing
or stated in the record, (2) must include findings of fact and conclusions of law, (3) must be based upon a
preponderance of evidence, and (4) must be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the facts.6

During the hearing, the Board did not state facts or law to support their conclusion about Rusk.
Therefore, the October 25 hearing did not constitute a final decision. However, the Board filed a
written order on December 1 that contained their finding of facts and conclusions of law for their
decisions. The written order, then, is considered a final decision by the court. NRS 233B.130(2)(d)
requires a petition to be filed after service of an administrative agency’s final decision.7 The period that
Risk had to file a petition for judicial review began after the December 1 written order was drafted instead
of after October 25 hearing. The court finds that Rusk’s petition was filed too early.
A prematurely filed petition for judicial review does not vest jurisdiction in the district court.
NRS 233B.130(2) governs whether petitions for judicial review filed prematurely should be
considered. Petitions for judicial review must: (1) name the agency and all parties of record, (2) must be
filed in district court, county where petitioner resides, or county where agency proceeding took place, (3)
must be served on the Attorney General, and (4) must be filed within 30 days after service of final decision.8
Rusk’s petition was filed 22 before the Board issued their written order. A petition filed early does not
satisfy the requirements under NRS 233B.130(2). Rusk’s petition for judicial review did not vest
jurisdiction in district court because it was filed prematurely.

Conclusion
Given that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Rusk’s petition, the Court granted the
Board’s petition for relief. A writ of prohibition will be issued to the Board ordering the district
court to grant the Board’s motion to dismiss Rusk’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court
vacated the stay that it previously imposed on October 12, 2018.
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